Jamaica celebrate their opening goal Wednesday night.
Neil W. Blackmon
The United States tumbled out of the 2015 CONCACAF Gold Cup Wednesday night in Atlanta, falling 2-1 to Jamaica. The match was the first loss for the Yanks to a Caribbean nation on home soil since 1968. It snapped a twenty-six game home unbeaten streak for the Americans, the longest in federation history. And it marked only the second loss for the United States ever to Jamaica, although both of those defeatshave come in competitive (non-friendly) matches during the Jurgen Klinsmann era. The Americans had questions entering tonight’s semifinal against the in-form Reggae Boyz and neither victory or defeat would answer those questions conclusively. But they are worth examining. And to some extent, many of the issues that have followed the United States through the last two years of the Klinsmann era were again on display at an exciting and loud Georgia Dome. They are questions that need to be answered as the US dive into the business end of the 2018 World Cup cycle, which sees World Cup qualifying begin this autumn and now will demand the US play a winner-take-all playoff against the 2015 Gold Cup champion in October to determine who will represent CONCACAF at the 2017 Confederations Cup in Russia. Heady stuff for a team that only a month and a half ago was flying after winning friendlies against world power Holland and world champion Germany.
Here are three thoughts, both on the loss to Jamaica itself and what is most pressing for the United States moving forward.
Ventura Alvarado fights for a ball in the air in the Gold Cup semifinal Wednesday.
The loss is a huge upset of course, but Jamaica deserved to win, punishing the United States for its mental mistakes.
In TYAC’s preview of the match, we wrote that it was imperative the US play smarter in the back than they have throughout the Gold Cup. It was one thing for Jurgen Klinsmann to take the reasonable risk of fielding a young, inexperienced but talented center back pairing, it is another to make mental mistakes. Jamaica defeated Jurgen Klinsmann’s charges in Kingston in World Cup qualifying last cycle when the Americans committed seven fouls and dangerous areas and were punished on set pieces. Tonight, Jamaica followed a similar formula, scoring both goals in the aftermath of fouls in dangerous areas.
On the first goal, the US parried away the set piece only to concede a deep throw in. Jamaica ran a very uncomplicated long throw play from Red Bulls fullback Kemar Lawrence to Vancouver Whitecap forward Darren Mattocks, who sandwiched between both US CB’s, managed to cleanly head the ball towards the far post, beating an outstretched Brad Guzan. It isn’t a complicated play, but the young American defenders seemed surprised by it.
On the second Jamaican goal, it was veteran goalkeeper Brad Guzan who made the big mental error. Brad Guzan collected a loose ball on a Jamaican counterattack in the 39th minute, but in his rush to start a US counter, he stepped outside the 18 box before releasing the ball. Referee Ricardo Montero quickly called a foul, and gave Jamaica a free kick in an extremely dangerous position. Giles Barnes promptly buried the free kick and five minutes before half, the Yanks were trailing 2-0 against a defense that at that point hadn’t conceded in 360+ minutes. And while the American players protesting the call are right that it is an offense oft-committed and rarely ever punished, Guzan didn’t argue that he’d committed an infraction after the match.
The US had lived on the edge all tournament with a young CB pairing consistently getting caught out of position and showing their youth with poor technical defending, both one v. one and positionally. But they hadn’t committed silly mental errors and poor fouls until tonight. These are the warts and risks of youth and Klinsmann’s gamble failed, which stings more given he had veteran players like Tim Ream and Omar Gonzalez available and another in Matt Besler at home. And while Jurgen Klinsmann may love the talents he has in John Brooks and Ace Alvarado, he should play a more veteran and proven group when qualifying begins this autumn.
For large spells of the match, the United States played some of their finest soccer of the tournament. But they are still terribly predictable offensively and entirely too reliant on Michael Bradley, and to some extent, 32 year old Clint Dempsey.
This was the United States xG chart for the semifinal. It bears out that the Reggae Boyz rode a bit of luck, with the US not finishing their chances. Those things happen in soccer.
https://twitter.com/MC_of_A/status/624007005682954240
And the US managed this level of sustained pressure against a defense that had defended well in both the Copa América and the Gold Cup. Yet despite the fact the US played some of its most complete attacking soccer, the loss also exposed the predictability of the US attack.
To a large extent, the US gameplan against a packed-in Jamaica defense was to get the ball to Michael Bradley, who would then do more or less whatever he was asked, rather than having a fixed role, and pump crosses into the box. Setting aside the foolishness of trying to beat a team with the best aerial defender in CONCACAF at CB in Wes Morgan in the air– this is a limited way to break a team down. Yes, the US had some nice moments on the left flank while Alejandro Bedoya and Fabian Johnson were in the match together, but that wrinkle mostly left when Yedlin entered on that flank. And yes, Aron Johannsson displayed his technical quality again, making smart runs through the channels and getting a ball on frame after a quick turn on the US goal, but Johannsson was too hesitant to shoot, looking for Dempsey first repeatedly. This predictability made the equalizer increasingly unlikely as the US tired, despite the best efforts of the men on the field, including substitution Alan Gordon.
For the second straight summer, Michael Bradley was asked to do too much by his manager.
Throughout the Gold Cup, the US midfield middled along-aside from Bradley. Mix Diskerud, lauded in friendly after friendly, was dire. Kyle Beckerman showed his age, and asked to do more than simply be a stopper in a diamond, what did fans expect? Alejandro Bedoya was outstanding, but had to be removed before 90 minutes in two matches he played, due to fitness issues. The US received little from any other midfielder.
Clint Dempsey scored six goals for the United States in this tournament. He is 32. Aron Johannsson showed much of his massive potential, but he also missed a free header just beyond the six that would have leveled the semifinal. Jozy Altidore, it bears repeating, was sent home. Jordan Morris, starlet of the friendly, is hurt and when he isn’t he’s still in college. Bobby Wood plays in the second division of Germany. The list goes on.
The United States need answers in attack beyond the four-headed figure of Dempsey, Bradley, Johnson and Bedoya. This is a problem that was going to be a problem if the US played in a final Sunday. And it will be a problem when the US play this autumn. As the manager, Jurgen Klinsmann’s job is to find answers to that problem. Typically, that is done tactically or through roster changes. Often both. Klinsmann has fallen short tactically, and that too should change. And it is that criticism of Klinsmann that leads to the third point.
Klinsmann looks out at the proceedings in Atlanta Wednesday.
Jurgen Klinsmann’s job is almost certainly not in jeopardy. But he wanted a healthy debate about soccer in this country. And that debate should include discussion about whether he’s the best choice moving forward.
Bob Bradley was always second choice for US Soccer. He was given the interim label in 2007, the steward to move the US forward until the long-term replacement could be found. And the guy Sunil Gulati always wanted was Jurgen Klinsmann, the former German star and manager who preferred California and whose sunny disposition and love of his adopted country was just the right combination of gusto and name-recognition that could propel US Soccer to the next-level it believed was its birthright. Klinsmann balked initially, about money or control or both, and Bradley was given the permanent reins.
Bradley’s sides didn’t play beautifully. They were a grit and grind bunch who counterattacked and took as many or more punches than they threw. But aware he’d been the second choice, Bradley still won the Gold Cup in 2007 and still orchestrated what remains US Soccer’s best win since 2002 when he beat nearly invincible Spain 2-0, and he was half an hour from winning the first international tournament in federation history when his side led Brazil in the second half of the 2009 Confederations Cup final. Bradley then won a World Cup group, which had never been accomplished in federation history. And in 2011, his team reached the final of the Gold Cup and led 2-0 before the team’s most valuable player, fullback Steve Cherundolo, injured a hamstring. The injury forced Jon Bornstein into action, and cold, Bornstein was lit-up as Mexico exploited him repeatedly in winning 4-2. Bob Bradley was dismissed thereafter, and you know the rest.
When Gulati hired Klinsmann, he gave him wide control, ultimately making him technical director of US soccer as well. This is the soccer equivalent of making a NFL coach general manager as well.
As technical director, there can be little question Klinsmann has succeeded. He’s changed and broadened the way the US scouts young players and aided in the expansion of existing development programs. He’s also a fine recruiter, even if he receives too much credit for some of the players currently in the pool. He’s brought in Fabian Johnson, one of the side’s best five players, as well as Aron Johannsson, Timothy Chandler, Bayern Munich prospect Julian Green, Ventura Alvarado and John Brooks, among others. These are victories for the US and all players who are either helping the US now or could and should later. His energy and enthusiasm for US soccer have also been massive. These are tangible benefits to the Klinsmann era in US Soccer that never applied to Bob Bradley. That’s true even if you question the wisdom of placing so much responsibility on one figure, which Sunil Gulati has done.
The verdict on Klinsmann the manager is decisively less clear. Managers are asked to win games. And in Klinsmann’s case, he took the gig promising to win games and change the way the United States played football. That’s not the technical director’s job, although they help. Style is on a manager, as any basic book about football instructs. Klinsmann promised proactive and attacking football. He vowed to have sides that imposed their will on lesser teams. It’s fine to argue that Klinsmann shouldn’t be compared to Bradley-– but don’t pretend results don’t matter just because he’s also the technical director, or argue that being technical director somehow alters results. Klinsmann has had chances to tell Gulati he can’t do both jobs at once. He hasn’t done that. And he should be evaluated for each job separately, lest we risk putting the chicken before the egg.
At the 2015 CONCACAF Gold Cup, the US failed to win enough games. That’s on the manager, especially in this case where the roster selections were questionable and the tactics mundane.
At the 2014 World Cup, the US escaped the toughest or second-toughest group but were overwhelmed in the Round of 16, again largely because of tactical failures. Klinsmann will get a Confederations Cup playoff in October, but he’ll get one only because Landon Donovan, the best player in US history, helped him win a Gold Cup in 2013, a summer before being cut from a World Cup team that in the end needed him desperately.
As for the promise of a proactive, attacking style, the US failed throughout this Gold Cup to impose their will on less-talented and less-technical opposition. They have outshot opponents only twice in competitive matches since qualifying for Brazil: tonight against Jamaica, and Saturday against Cuba. They have played their best soccer in friendlies on European soil, where the chip-on-the-shoulder pep talk merges with US Soccer’s old standard, counterattacking football.
It’s been football for the pragmatists. Which may or may not be fine. Certainly that’s what the US had before. And pragmatism executed flawlessly was enough to defeat mighty Spain at the peak of its power.
The problem, of course, is we were promised football for the poets. As the Brazilian great Socrates said, it isn’t just about winning. It’s about joy.
Tonight, there’s not much joy in US soccer. And that’s on the coach, no matter how well the technical director is doing.
Neil W. Blackmon is Co-Founder of The Yanks Are Coming. You can reach him at nwblackmon@gmail.com and you can follow him on Twitter @nwblackmon.